In the homeland security world we are all in the race for the big pie, the federal dollars. That's why it's especially disconcerting to see a national LE figure say something like this: “All my community policing grants turned into fire trucks, and homeland security became the monster that ate law enforcement.” Really? Really?
For starters, I don't believe that is true. Predictably, I believe the fire service doesn't get enough (or the right kind of) attention from the feds when it comes to homeland security. I also believe the cops get too much and want more. They want more money and more control, from street cops who want to tell the fire department when they can disregard a scene to the police chiefs who want to tell the fire chief what is and is not a hazmat incident. Federal grants have only accelerated the power grabs, with LE agencies all over the country moving into fields for which they are not qualified, trained, or experienced. From patrol cars with Level B CPC they don't know how to maintain or put on to police department rescue squads competing with fire department rescue squads, there is a disturbing trend of mission creep for them and marginilization for us.
Budgets are zero-sum games where each agency has to make a convincing argument that it deserves as much or more money as the next. When it comes to fire vs. police we start out at a disadvantage. Few people are scared of fire, but everyone is scared of being mugged (broad generalization). Your agency has to develop a strategic communications plan that combines smart leadership with clear illustrations of public worth. There are a lot of reasons the cops beat us at budget time (they bring in ticket revenue, the public is scared of crime, they market themselves better, etc.), but I think one of the biggest is a fire service-wide strategic problem. Namely, fire chiefs aren't as professional as police chiefs, as a group. We don't have dozens of undergraduate and graduate degree programs at legitimate universities and we don't have numerous truly peer-reviewed journals producing quality research. The fire service needs to stop thinking of itself as a great alternative to college for people "who just don't like school." A fire chief with a technical certificate from a community college or bachelor's from an internet-only school is at a significant disadvantage next to a police chief with a master's degree in CJ from a brick-and-mortar university.
I realize this is an unpopular and maybe inflammatory opinion. Let me be clear: firemen are smart. We all know that, but firefighters aren't always studious or intellectual. I've heard a lot of firefighters complain about being treated like garbage men. To that I'll ask a question: what do you have on your resume that sets you apart from the garbage men? And a hint: weekend NFA extension schools don't matter.
Sunday, January 25, 2009
Sunday, January 18, 2009
Disorder on the Doorstep*
* I stole this title from a chapter of John Robb's intriguing book on the future of terrorism and globalization.
So the Department of Defense is worried about Mexico and the news has finally trickled down to the AP. In short, a report that hopes to foresee looming and emerging strategic threats states "In terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force and indeed the world, two large and important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico," (36).
IF this were to happen what would be the fallout for the fire service in the border states? Affected Mexican states are burdened with mass killings on almost a daily basis, the police and military are under direct assault, and the legitimacy of local governments is in question. I doubt we'll see a challenge to legitimacy out of all this, but we could see the mass killings and direct combat with LE and the military.
For the fire service, I'd be more concerned by the flow of refugees coming across the border in case things get worse. The American fire service has never been on the front lines of a humanitarian crisis so I am not sure what it would look like. Along the border and the corridors leading from the border to places like Phoenix, LA, and Houston, you could have an influx of thousands (tens of thousands?) of people in a matter of days. This happened in the Houston and Beaumont areas during Katrina when people from NOLA packed hotels, four, six, ten to a room. EMS calls will go through the roof as you have poor people packed tight in unfamiliar surroundings under high stress. They won't have their meds, there will be assaults and other criminal activity, and multi-dwelling fires will take on added urgency.
Just something to think about an emerging potential threat for the fire service, and the report itself is interesting as general background.
So the Department of Defense is worried about Mexico and the news has finally trickled down to the AP. In short, a report that hopes to foresee looming and emerging strategic threats states "In terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force and indeed the world, two large and important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico," (36).
IF this were to happen what would be the fallout for the fire service in the border states? Affected Mexican states are burdened with mass killings on almost a daily basis, the police and military are under direct assault, and the legitimacy of local governments is in question. I doubt we'll see a challenge to legitimacy out of all this, but we could see the mass killings and direct combat with LE and the military.
For the fire service, I'd be more concerned by the flow of refugees coming across the border in case things get worse. The American fire service has never been on the front lines of a humanitarian crisis so I am not sure what it would look like. Along the border and the corridors leading from the border to places like Phoenix, LA, and Houston, you could have an influx of thousands (tens of thousands?) of people in a matter of days. This happened in the Houston and Beaumont areas during Katrina when people from NOLA packed hotels, four, six, ten to a room. EMS calls will go through the roof as you have poor people packed tight in unfamiliar surroundings under high stress. They won't have their meds, there will be assaults and other criminal activity, and multi-dwelling fires will take on added urgency.
Just something to think about an emerging potential threat for the fire service, and the report itself is interesting as general background.
Sunday, January 4, 2009
When is an MCI MVA not an MCI MVA?
On a busy weekend shopping day two weeks before Christmas somebody dropped two bottles of acid out of a tall building in Hong Kong. Forty-six people were injured and if any progress is being made in the investigation the newspapers aren't reporting it. The BBC reported that the bottles were each 750ml in size and contained an unknown acid.
Whether this was a terroristic attack, simple criminal mischief, or a mere accident, it demonstrates one of the most overlooked, least spectacular, threats we face in the United States. I am out of the loop on the zeitgeist in Hong Kong but I'll wager that if something like this happened here in the middle of the big shopping season we'd be hearing about it for weeks. If it happened more than once in different places, thus demonstrating that it is some sort of coordinated attack, it would probably lead to the sort of hysteria not seen since Amerithrax. Specific to this case, I can see engine companies running all over town to identify Coke somebody poured out on the sidewalk or a spilled bottle of water in the mall.
I'll take it a step further, though. In 1976 an anhydrous ammonia tractor-trailer fell off an overpass at US Hwy 59 and I-610 in Houston, killing six, hospitalizing 78, and injuring around 100 more. That's close to 200 casualties from one truck with no explosives. Just like the bottles of acid, we would treat this as a standard chemical release/MCI and it would be mitigated fairly straightforwardly.
The point is that terrorism doesn't have to be a belt bomb in a restaurant or a plane into a building: it can be something small, improvised, and dual-use. Some people argue that al Qaeda set the bar so high with 9/11 that they won't attempt anything less spectacular for fear of looking like their capacities have diminished. Even if this assesment is accurate we still have to worry about myriad domestic threats and other Islamist groups. No matter what law enforcement and the military do to preempt threats, some means will always be there for those with the intent in our open society. The public and TV wonks have a touch of selective hearing when it comes to this ugly truth and so we don't get as much attention on the mitigation side as those on the prevention side do.
While we can't stop the most dedicated and resourceful threats, we can prepare for the familiar on a larger and scarier scale. When is an MCI MVA not an MCI MVA? When it is coordinated and purposeful- then it's a terrorist attack and people freak out. It may not make much of a difference in how my company or your company handles the scene, but it does mean we are more likely to see greater numbers of casualties with more complications than an accidental incident of similar nature. The take-away is that two of the absolute, most essential, real world steps we can take to prepare for improvised terrorism is to brush up on our decon skills (no pun intended) and make sure we have our triage and MCI systems practiced and organized. And don't for a second doubt that the foundation of succesful MCI management is strong ICS.
To repeat: the most important first steps you can take for operational preparedness, with little expense and time, are to practice your mass decon and ICS/MCI SOP's. (Assuming you already have mass decon, ICS, and MCI SOP's and use acceptable PPE; if you don't you have bigger problems than terrorism).
Whether this was a terroristic attack, simple criminal mischief, or a mere accident, it demonstrates one of the most overlooked, least spectacular, threats we face in the United States. I am out of the loop on the zeitgeist in Hong Kong but I'll wager that if something like this happened here in the middle of the big shopping season we'd be hearing about it for weeks. If it happened more than once in different places, thus demonstrating that it is some sort of coordinated attack, it would probably lead to the sort of hysteria not seen since Amerithrax. Specific to this case, I can see engine companies running all over town to identify Coke somebody poured out on the sidewalk or a spilled bottle of water in the mall.
I'll take it a step further, though. In 1976 an anhydrous ammonia tractor-trailer fell off an overpass at US Hwy 59 and I-610 in Houston, killing six, hospitalizing 78, and injuring around 100 more. That's close to 200 casualties from one truck with no explosives. Just like the bottles of acid, we would treat this as a standard chemical release/MCI and it would be mitigated fairly straightforwardly.
The point is that terrorism doesn't have to be a belt bomb in a restaurant or a plane into a building: it can be something small, improvised, and dual-use. Some people argue that al Qaeda set the bar so high with 9/11 that they won't attempt anything less spectacular for fear of looking like their capacities have diminished. Even if this assesment is accurate we still have to worry about myriad domestic threats and other Islamist groups. No matter what law enforcement and the military do to preempt threats, some means will always be there for those with the intent in our open society. The public and TV wonks have a touch of selective hearing when it comes to this ugly truth and so we don't get as much attention on the mitigation side as those on the prevention side do.
While we can't stop the most dedicated and resourceful threats, we can prepare for the familiar on a larger and scarier scale. When is an MCI MVA not an MCI MVA? When it is coordinated and purposeful- then it's a terrorist attack and people freak out. It may not make much of a difference in how my company or your company handles the scene, but it does mean we are more likely to see greater numbers of casualties with more complications than an accidental incident of similar nature. The take-away is that two of the absolute, most essential, real world steps we can take to prepare for improvised terrorism is to brush up on our decon skills (no pun intended) and make sure we have our triage and MCI systems practiced and organized. And don't for a second doubt that the foundation of succesful MCI management is strong ICS.
To repeat: the most important first steps you can take for operational preparedness, with little expense and time, are to practice your mass decon and ICS/MCI SOP's. (Assuming you already have mass decon, ICS, and MCI SOP's and use acceptable PPE; if you don't you have bigger problems than terrorism).
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